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THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
CHANCE OR GUARANTEE?
The constitutional guarantee of "effective assistance" of counsel is a
guarantee with a purpose. That purpose is not, as some people
seem to believe, to "shift the balance" against the "peace forces" in
favor of the "criminal element." It is to assure that our adversary
system of justice really is adversary and really does justice.
I. Introduction
Appellate courts have been receiving a growing number of appeals
based on attorney incompetence. 2 While case loads in the criminal
courts are increasing, 3 public defense programs have suffered massive
budget cuts. 4 These factors have placed criminal defendants in danger
of losing one of their most precious constitutional rights: 5 the right to
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment.6
1. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1973)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon, Defective Assistance].
2. There were more than 10,000 published opinions dealing with claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel between 1970 and 1980, representing an increase from the
early 1960's. Ranii, Appealing A Lawyer's 'Mistakes,' Nat'l L.J., Oct. 5, 1981, at 1,
col. 4 & 14, col. 1. The proliferation of claims has been attributed to: "the increased
use of habeas corpus proceedings to challenge sentences; the increasing complexity of
criminal cases; [and] the increase in the number of attorneys involved in criminal
trials as a result of the expanded right to counsel . I..." d  at 14, col. 1.
3. For example, in 1976, the total number of cases disposed of by the Criminal
Court of the City of New York was 220,734. In 1977, the number of dispositions
increased by over 10,000, to 231,500. TWENTY-THiRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFER-
ENCE 65 (1978). Trial courts are not alone in being overburdened by unmanageable
case loads. Justice Stevens recently commented on the number of cases pending
before the Supreme Court. He stated that because of the great number of cases, he is
unable to look at the papers in over 80% of the cases that are filed. 68 A.B.A.J. 1201
(1982). See also Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1, at 5 (describing the case
loads of criminal courts in urban areas as reaching "crisis proportions"); Schwarzer,
Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633,
634 (1980) (maintaining that "staggering case loads and limited resources" are causes
of marginal performance by counsel).
4. In 1981, funding for the Legal Services Corp. was slashed by 25%, a decrease
of $80 million in funding, creating a loss of more than 1,700 of the agency's 6,300
lawyers. Further reductions in funding are expected, leaving a gap in legal represen-
tation of the indigent which the private bar will be unable to fill. Morrison, Is Pro
Bono Filling the LSC Gap?, Nat'l L.J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
5. "Of all of the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by
counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights
he may have." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV.
1, 8 (1956). The importance of the right to effective assistance of counsel is perhaps
most apparent in view of the more than 1,000 inmates on death row who lack skilled
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Members of the judiciary7 and other commentators8 have expressed
grave concern over the increase in claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Those authors have advanced a variety of theories addressing
both the causes9 of and possible remedies' 0 for attorney incompetence.
attorneys to prosecute their appeals. See generally Clendinen, Rising Death Row
Population Burdens Volunteer Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 5 ("the
condemned may soon begin to be executed not for lack of legal appeals to be made,
but for the lack of skilled lawyers to make them").
6. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Several judges have written extensively and demonstrated grave concern on the
subject of attorney incompetence. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and
Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon, Gideon and
Argersinger]; Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1; Burger, Some Further
Reflections on the Problem of Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1980); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
cation of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Burger, Special Skills]; Erickson, Standards of Compe-
tency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 233 (1979);
Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175 (1974); Schwarzer,
supra note 3. But see Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere,
10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613 (1977) (expressing skepticism over the growing concern
about attorney incompetence).
8. See, e.g., Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases:
Departures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973); Smithburn &
Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel: In Quest of a Uniform Standard of
Review, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (1981); Tague, The Attempt to Improve
Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (1977); Waltz, Inade-
quacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in
Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964); Note, Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
sel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Lingering Debate]; Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 752 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective
Assistance]; Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Princi-
ples for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Basis for Relief].
9. Judge Kaufman has stated that the three essential causes of poor advocacy are:
the lack of experience, competence and integrity. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 176.
Chief Justice Burger has maintained that our historic insistence on treating every
person admitted to the bar as qualified to render all types of legal advice is to blame.
Justice Burger has also criticized certain aspects of law school education for promot-
ing poor advocacy. Burger, Special Skills, supra note 7, at 231-32. Judge Bazelon has
suggested that the burden of heavy case loads promotes the rationalization of ineffec-
tive performance by attorneys, the toleration of incompetence by the courts, and the
institutionalization of ineffectiveness by the system. Bazelon, Defective Assistance,
supra note 1, at 5. Judge Schwarzer has asserted that economic considerations often
cause criminal cases to be processed on an "assembly line basis." Schwarzer, supra
note 3, at 635.
10. Two distinct approaches have emerged in the area of reform. The specializa-
tion approach advocates developing separate requirements for trial lawyers. The
continuing education approach would require all lawyers to update their legal
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
Yet, while the debate continues, and courts remain reluctant to deal
with ineffectiveness claims," defendants continue to suffer serious
consequences from the derelictions of indifferent or inept counsel. 
12
The sixth amendment is silent on the questions of when counsel
must be provided and what minimum level of attorney competence
will satisfy constitutional scrutiny.1 3 The Supreme Court has not yet
defined a meaningful standard, leaving lower courts to fashion their
own criteria based on dicta drawn from Supreme Court decisions.
The standards by which effective assistance has been evaluated vary
widely among federal and state courts,' 4 producing considerable con-
fusion concerning what constitutes effective assistance. As a result of
that confusion, courts have tolerated attorney incompetence seriously
prejudicial to defendants.' 5 Compounding the problem is the uncer-
tainty concerning whether a showing of prejudice is required for a
defendant to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim."' As one judge has
education periodically by taking specialized courses. See Bazelon, Gideon and Arger-
singer, supra note 7, at 816-17.
11. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 635. Several reasons have been suggested
for the courts' reluctance to deal with ineffectiveness claims, including: the fear of
the number of claims, the desire to preserve the pretense that justice is being done,
and the unwillingness to harm the reputations of fellow attorneys. Bazelon, Defective
Assistance, supra note 1, at 22-25. This traditional reluctance has been strongly
criticized. See, e.g., Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1978) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (asserting that the Supreme Court "shirks its
central responsibility as the court of last resort" by refusing to review a case involving
minimum standards for attorney competence).
12. "No matter upon whose doorstep the judge cared to lay blame for counsel's
lack of preparation, the cost of the failure should not have been visited upon the
defendant who was without responsibility." Brescia v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921, 926
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (defendant's conviction upheld al-
though his appointed counsel was required to begin trial with slightly more than an
hour's preparation).
13. It has been suggested that the Framers of the Constitution intended to provide
the accused with the limited right to hire counsel for his defense. Note, The Linger-
ing Debate, supra note 8, at 659 n.3 (citing W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 29 (1955)).
14. See Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 8, at 528-33 (surveying the various
standards applied by federal and state courts).
15. Examples of unmonitored attorney misconduct may be found in the following
cases: United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970) (counsel asleep during
co-counsel's examination of a witness); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962, 967
(10th Cir. 1941) (although testimony established that counsel was drunk during the
entire trial, the court's attitude was encapsulated by the response "[w]hat of it?");
People v. Smith, 61 A.D.2d 91, 101, 401 N.Y.S.2d 353, 359 (4th Dep't 1978)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting) (in response to the court's question about a case counsel
had just cited, he commented: "[T]hat was just a wild stab .... I didn't read the
opinion, so I can't properly argue that it is on the nose, that it might even be
pertinent").
16. See notes 61-78 infra and accompanying text.
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noted, the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel is in danger of becoming mere rhetoric unless a uniform set of
standards is applied by the courts.17
This Comment will review the historical development of the right
to effective assistance of counsel as defined by the Supreme Court, and
discuss the various standards applied by lower federal courts. This
Comment will next examine United States v. Decoster,'8 which pro-
vides the most comprehensive judicial analysis of the right to effective
assistance of counsel to date. The standards applied by the New York
State courts will also be analyzed. Finally, uniform guidelines for
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will be recom-
mended.
II. The Historical Development of the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel
A. The Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the scope of the sixth
amendment right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama.19 Using a four-
teenth amendment due process analysis,20 the Court held that in
capital cases, the state must assign counsel to assist indigent criminal
defendants who would be incapable of conducting their own de-
fense. 21 Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, asserted that
defendants require "the guiding hand of counsel, ' 22 and emphasized
the fundamental character of that right.2 3 Although there is some
question concerning whether Powell required either the timely ap-
17. See Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1, at 20.
18. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Decoster I"), on remand, Crim. No. 2002-71
(D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Decoster II'), aff'd en
bane, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) ("Decoster III"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the Supreme Court reversed the rape convic-
tions of eight indigent and illiterate youths who had been assigned counsel on the
morning of trial.
20. The Court stated that counsel must be provided "as a necessary requisite of
due process of law." Id. at 71. Reliance on a fourteenth amendment due process
analysis for evaluating ineffectiveness claims has been criticized for focusing on the
overall fairness of the trial, rather than on the particular conduct of counsel. A sixth
amendment analysis has the advantage of being more thorough, by requiring courts
to look directly at counsel's conduct. Basis for Relief, supra note 8, at 7.
21. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The Court later extended the right to indigent defend-
ants accused of felonies in federal courts in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22. The Court specified that those defendants who are "ignorant and illiterate, or
those of feeble intellect" are particularly in need of an attorney's guidance. Powell,
287 U.S. at 69.
23. Id. at 68, 73.
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pointment of counsel or the broader right to effective assistance of
counsel,2 4 dicta in the opinion suggests the broader reading.
25
Betts v. Brady26 represented a regression from the expansive reading
of the sixth amendment right to counsel provided in Powell. In Betts,
the Court again used a fourteenth amendment analysis, 27 and de-
clined to extend the right to counsel to indigent criminal defendants in
state courts, except in limited circumstances. 28
Twenty years later the Court overruled Betts in Gideon v.
Wainwright. 2  The Court expanded the sixth amendment right to
counsel to the status of "a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial,"' 30 and made that right applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.3 Thus, Gideon afforded to indigent criminal
defendants in state courts the same right to counsel enjoyed by their
counterparts in federal courts. 32 Moreover, with the more stringent
sixth amendment analysis employed by the Court in Gideon, it is clear
that the right to counsel affords the defendant more than just pro
forma representation. 33
24. See, e.g., Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance, supra note
8, at 754 n. 11 (citing Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representa-
tion, 15 AM. CRM. L. REV. 109, 113) (advocating the theory that Powell is limited to
timely appointment of counsel). But see Erickson, supra note 7, at 235; Waltz, supra
note 8, at 293-94 (maintaining that Powell should be read broadly to include the
rendering of effective aid).
25. Erickson, supra note 7, at 235. The Court warned that the duty to assign
counsel "is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circum-
stances as to preclude the giving of effective aid .... Powell, 287 U.S. at 71
(emphasis added).
26. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471.
28. The Court mandated court appointed counsel only where the lack of such
representation would result in "a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice .... " Id. at 462.
29. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon involved a defendant who represented himself at
trial and was convicted of a felony after a Florida state court denied his request for
appointed counsel.
30. Id. at 340. The Court noted that "any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id.
at 344.
31. Id. at 342.
32. The Court maintained that both the national and state constitutions empha-
size fair trials in which "every defendant stands equal before the law." Id. at 344.
33. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 8, at 236 (asserting that Gideon's more strin-
gent sixth amendment analysis established an expanded theoretical and constitutional
basis for the right to counsel). The Court has extended the right to counsel to indigent
defendants accused of misdemeanors for which imprisonment is actually imposed.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to counsel is
the right to effective counsel. 34 Yet, the Court has found ineffective
assistance per se only in certain narrowly defined situations. These
include cases of direct governmental interference preventing counsel
from rendering effective aid,35 and cases of joint representation result-
ing in an actual conflict of interest a.3  The Court has yet to define
when attorney incompetence based on an attorney's misconduct will
result in a sixth amendment violation.
In McMann v. Richardson,37 the Court was called on to determine
the validity of a guilty plea allegedly based on erroneous advice of
counsel. 38 In dicta, the Court implied a standard for evaluating attor-
ney performance, stating that counsel's advice must be "within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 39The
Court declined to provide a more explicit standard, relegating the
responsibility to the lower courts. 40 A warning was given, however,
that "defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel
".41
34. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), citing Reece v. Geor-
gia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57
(1932).
35. See, e.g., Ceders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (counsel restricted from
conferring with defendant during trial recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975) (defense counsel denied closing argument in nonjury case); Brooks v. Tennes-
see, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (defendant required to testify prior to other defense wit-
nesses); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (defendant prevented from testify-
ing through direct examination).
36. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (sixth amendment violation
established where defendant proves that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his counsel's performance); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978)
(automatic reversal where court improperly required joint representation over timely
objection).
37. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
38. The Court held that a defendant who alleges that his guilty plea resulted from
a prior coerced confession is not, without more, entitled to a hearing on his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 771.
39. Id. However, this standard has been criticized for not providing meaningful
guidance for the lower courts. The "reasonable competence" standard has been
referred to as "an empty shell." Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assist-
ance, supra note 8, at 755. See also Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 8, at 504
n.38 ("gross error" may be the standard, as McMann "reasonableness" standard is
unclear).
40. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
41. The Court added that judges should strive to maintain proper standards for
performance by criminal defense counsel who are practicing in their courts. Id. See
also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (counsel's advice not within the range
of reasonable competence may serve as a basis for a constitutional challenge). More
recently, in a multiple representation case, the Court reaffirmed its position that the
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Thus, although it is well established that the sixth amendment
guarantees the effective assistance of counsel, 42 it is still unclear pre-
cisely what level of attorney competence is required. As a result, lower
federal and state courts have been left to devise their own criteria,
leaving a defendant's ineffectiveness claim largely to an ad hoc deter-
mination.
B. Lower Federal and State Court Standards
Initially, all lower federal and state courts applied the "farce and
mockery" standard enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Diggs v. Welch. 43 This test requires that the
circumstances surrounding the trial must shock the conscience of the
court and make the proceedings "a farce and mockery of justice"' 44 for
a claim of attorney incompetence to be successful. Thus, a heavy
burden is placed on the defendant. He must prove not only his attor-
ney's incompetence, but also that the entire proceedings were reduced
to a sham. 45 Not surprisingly, application of this test resulted in few
reversals of convictions. 46
The "farce and mockery" test has been widely criticized as being so
peremptory as to deprive defendants of their sixth amendment
rights.47 The test fails not only to examine the attorney's conduct
sixth amendment requires more than just the mere appointment of counsel. The
Court added that it would not distinguish between retained and appointed counsel
for purposes of the sixth amendment analysis. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980).
42. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
43. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). In Diggs, the
court denied the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which alleged that
his counsel had coerced him into entering a guilty plea.
44. Id. at 670.
45. The "farce and mockery" standard derives from the fifth amendment due
process clause. Id. at 669. As such, the standard examines the conduct of the attorney
during trial, which necessarily precludes an examination of counsel's conduct before
trial. The narrowness of the standard is one ground on which it has been criticized.
See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 7, at 239.
46. See Basis for Relief, supra note 8, at 28 (noting that the universal attitude of
the courts following the "farce and mockery" standard is that "the errors, faults or
omissions of an attorney, except those of the most serious sort are insufficient to
constitute a denial of the right to effective representation").
47. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 7, at 238-39. Judge Erickson criticized the
"farce and mockery" standard on four grounds: (1) the test requires too minimal a
level of attorney performance; (2) the standard requires less of lawyers than the law
requires of other professionals, namely doctors; (3) the standard provides little guid-
ance for courts and attorneys; and (4) the standard fails to monitor attorney conduct
at all stages of the proceedings. See also Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1,
at 28 ("[t]he 'mockery' test requires such a minimal level of performance from
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during the crucial pre-trial stage, 48 but also fails to provide a uniform
standard for the lower courts.4 9 Although several justifications have
been advanced in support of this standard, 0 it has been abandoned by
all circuits but the Second Circuit5 l and a minority of state courts.
5 2
Gideon and McMann heralded the trend away from the earlier fifth
amendment "farce and mockery" standard toward variations of the
sixth amendment "reasonable competence" approach.5 3 Adopted by a
majority of circuits, the sixth amendment analysis demands a higher
level of attorney performance than the "farce and mockery" stand-
ard.5 4 The "reasonableness" standard represents an improvement over
the "farce and mockery" standard in that it measures the attorney's
performance against accepted norms within the legal community,55
counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth amendment"); Tague, supra note 8, at
115 (calling the test "inappropriate if not unconstitutional").
48. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
50. Common justifications for this standard include the fear of "putting defense
counsel on trial before the reviewing court," the overwhelming case load and the
need to eliminate frivolous appeals, and the need to prevent feigned cases of ineffec-
tiveness. Basis for Relief, supra note 8, at 30-31.
51. See Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 431 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S.Ct. 2902 (1982) (commenting that the Second Circuit is alone in adhering to the
"farce and mockery" standard). The Second Circuit has been urged, however, to
abandon its position and adopt a less stringent standard. See, e.g., Brinkley v.
LeFevre, 621 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir.) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
868 (1980) ("[t]he Second Circuit's test demeans the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
meaningful counsel, [and] the guarantee of equality before the law .... Surely the
state bars of Connecticut, New York and Vermont are no less capable than the rest of
the American legal profession .... ").
52. A recent survey indicates that only 21 states still utilize the "farce and mock-
ery" standard. Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 8, at 530-33.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 631 F.2d 198 (3d Cir. 1980) (exercise of
"customary skill and knowledge"); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (adopting the McMann "reasonable compe-
tence" standard); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (counsel must
render "reasonably effective assistance").
54. One commentator has stated that the "reasonable competence" standard is, by
definition, superior to the "farce and mockery" standard. See Tague, supra note 8, at
115 n.31 (1977). See also Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (commending the shift from the "farce
and mockery" standard to the "reasonable competence" approach because an objec-
tive reference replaced a "peculiarly subjective one").
55. Measuring the attorney's performance against community norms is inherently
more objective than the "farce and mockery" approach. See Erickson, supra note 7,
at 241 ("reasonable competence" standard more objective because courts seek inde-
pendent criteria by which to measure the claim). See also Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) ("the
judgment is made with reference to a fact the court knows or can determine by
inquiry"). Where the prevailing values within a community are less than desirable,
however, the reasonableness approach may not be acceptable. See Erickson, supra
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rather than against the less certain standard of the outcome of the trial
as a whole.56 Furthermore, the "reasonableness" standard measures
the attorney's conduct from the time of appointment, not from the
commencement of trial.5 7
Despite its apparent superiority to the "farce and mockery" stand-
ard, however, the ."reasonableness" standard effectively offers little
improvement. The standard has been criticized as being unnecessarily
subjective.5 8 As with its predecessor, the "farce and mockery" stand-
ard, the "reasonableness" standard fails to provide adequate guidance
for the lower courts,59 and may represent a change in form only. 0
C. The Requirement of Demonstrating Prejudice
Two dominant issues may arise in evaluating a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, the court must determine whether the
attorney's performance rendered effective assistance. Second, not-
withstanding a finding of inadequate attorney performance, several
circuits require proof of prejudice to a defendant's case before a sixth
amendment violation will be found. Although all circuits but the Sixth
Circuit maintain the prejudice requirement, there emerges no general
standard which defines the kind or degree of prejudice which the
defendant or government must show.61
note 7, at 241-42 (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), in which the
Supreme Court held that an attorney's failure to challenge a racially segregated
grand jury was not ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court noted that the
attorney's conduct conformed to local norms. Id. at 269).
56. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (inquiry focuses on constitutionally sufficient perform-
ance rather than on what occurred at trial).
58. Judge Erickson has criticized the "reasonable competence" approach on two
grounds: (1) the test depends on the court's subjective perception of the legal commu-
nity; and (2) the standard itself is highly subjective because, like the "farce and
mockery" standard, it lacks intrinsic meaning. Erickson, supra note 7, at 241.
59. Courts have failed to define which acts fall outside the range of "reasonable
competence." The subjective nature of this approach leaves few guidelines for lower
courts to follow. See, e.g., Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 8, at 507; Basisfor
Relief, supra note 8, at 42 ("courts still are not told what they ought to expect of
defense counsel .... ").
60. Commentators have recently noted that while the range of competence stand-
ard may appear to be progressive, "the change is of form and not of substance."
Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 8, at 507.
61. A comprehensive analysis of the prejudice requirement in the circuit courts is
provided in Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 896-900 (5th Cir. 1982).
The District of Columbia, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
clearly require a showing of prejudice. See Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336 (3d Cir.
1982]
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As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Glasser v. United
States,6 2 some lower courts concluded that prejudice need not be
shown whenever the right to counsel had been violated.6 3 In Glasser,
the joint representation of two co-defendants gave rise to a conflict of
interest.64 The Court stated that "[t]he right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its de-
nial." 65 Indeed, many courts66 and commentators 7 have expressed
1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
The Second and Fourth Circuits also require a showing of prejudice, although
their positions are less clearly defined. See United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182 (2d
Cir. 1980); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968).
The First and Seventh Circuits have indicated that a showing of prejudice may be
required. See United States v. Ritch, 583 F.2d 1179 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978) (habeas corpus relief denied where no prejudice shown). However, one
week later, the First Circuit indicated that there was still confusion regarding the
showing of prejudice. United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978). There is
similar confusion in recent Seventh Circuit decisions. Compare United States v.
Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1980) (denial of habeas corpus relief based in part
on petitioner's failure to demonstrate prejudice) with United States ex rel. Healey v.
Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (stating that the
harmless error doctrine should never be applied to ineffectiveness claims).
The Tenth Circuit appears to be undecided whether a demonstration of prejudice
is necessary in all cases. See United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980)
(court did not hold that prejudice is never relevant, but declined to require a showing
of prejudice in the case before it); United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122 (10th
Cir. 1980) (rejecting the requirement that the defendant show prejudice, placing the
burden of proof on the government to establish the lack of prejudice).
The Sixth Circuit is apparently the only circuit to reject the prejudice requirement.
See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (harmless error tests
do not apply to the evaluation of ineffectiveness claims). There is reason to believe
that the Sixth Circuit may be re-evaluating its position in light of United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981). See Turner v. Engle, No. 80-3302 (N.D. Ohio Dec.
30, 1981), aJJ'd, 673 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1981) (indicating that a showing of preju-
dice may be required). The Ninth Circuit may be joining the Sixth Circuit in
rejecting the prejudice requirement. See Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1748 (1982) (prejudice need not be shown where sixth
amendment violation resulted from trial court's unreasonable refusal to grant contin-
uance).
62. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
63. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 586 F.2d
1325 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (relying on Glasser to dispense
with the prejudice requirement); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th
Cir. 1974). But see cases cited in note 61 supra, which require a showing of preju-
dice.
64. The Court set aside Glasser's conviction, stating that the conflict of interest
resulting from the joint representation constituted a sixth amendment violation.
Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76.
65. Id.
66. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), afJ'd, 586 F.2d 1325
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disapproval of the prejudice requirement, although others rigorously
adhere to it.68 In Chambers v. Maroney,9 the Supreme Court refused
to apply a per se rule 70 regarding the showing of prejudice in a case in
which counsel was unprepared as a result of late appointment. 7'
Chambers is not dispositive of the prejudice issue, however, as the
Court did not indicate whether prejudice is an indispensable element
of all constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 72
Recently, in United States v. Morrison,73 the Supreme Court
refused to dismiss an indictment without a showing of prejudice al-
though the defendant had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel. 4 In Morrison, the Court labelled the conduct of federal
agents who had met with the defendant without defense counsel's
knowledge or permission as "egregious. ' 75 However, it was held that
the relief requested, dismissal of the indictment, was not appropriate
absent "demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof .... .76
Morrison should not be interpreted to mandate a requirement of
prejudice for an appellant to prevail on every ineffectiveness claim.
Some courts have wisely adopted a narrower interpretation, limiting
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d
887 (6th Cir. 1974).
67. See, e.g., Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1, at 29; Note, A Func-
tional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L, REV. 1053, 1067-
68 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Functional Analysis]; Note, Ineffective Assist-
ance and the Harmless Error Rule: the Eighth Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1384, 1397-1401 (1975).
68. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. See also Basis for Relief, supra note
8, at 75-77 (arguing that a per se rule is inapplicable to ineffectiveness claims,
because the right to effective assistance is only a "gloss" on the right to counsel).
69. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
70. Id. at 53-54.
71. In Chambers, the Court found that reversal of every conviction is not required
following late appointment of counsel. The Court affirmed the denial of a hearing to
the appellant who based his ineffectiveness claim on the fact that his newly ap-
pointed counsel for his second trial did not confer with the appellant until the
morning of trial. Id. at 54.
72. See, e.g., "Decoster III," 624 F.2d 196, 292 n.140 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979) (arguing that Chambers does not
address the issue of the burden of proving prejudice); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d
1325, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (arguing that Chambers does not require a separate
showing of prejudice); Note, Functional Analysis, supra note 67, at 1064 (maintain-
ing that Chambers is not dispositive of the prejudice issue).
73. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
74. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the respondent's sixth amendment
rights had been violated under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 364. Yet, as the
respondent failed to demonstrate prejudice, the Court refused to uphold the court of
appeals' dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 366-67.
75. Id. at 367.
76. Id. at 365.
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Morrison to a requirement of a showing of prejudice by the appellant
only when the drastic remedy of dismissal of an indictment is sought. 77
The requirement of showing prejudice in every case of ineffective-
ness places an unduly harsh burden on the defendant whose attorney's
incompetence keeps out of the record the very evidence that an appel-
late court would require for a showing of prejudice.78 A uniform
requirement concerning the showing of prejudice, like a uniform
standard by which to measure ineffectiveness claims, is necessary to
insure a uniform application of the sixth amendment.
III. United States v. Decoster: The Explosive Debate
of the Standards
A. The Judgmental Approach v. The Categorical Approach
United States v. Decoster7 9 is a procedurally complex case whose
history typifies the confusion concerning both the standards by which
attorney competence should be measured and the necessity of demon-
strating prejudice. Two contrasting judicial philosophies are pre-
sented: Judge Leventhal's judgmental approach8 ° and Judge Bazelon's
categorical approach."'
In "Decoster J,' '82 the appellant appealed his conviction for aiding
and abetting an armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon.8 3
In a panel opinion written by Judge Bazelon, the court noted sua
sponte five grounds on which a claim of a sixth amendment right to
counsel violation could have been based.8 4 The court specifically re-
77. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982)
(maintaining that Morrison would not preclude reversal of a conviction).
78. For example, a failure to investigate a case or to interview a witness before
trial would not be evident in the trial record which the appellate court would review.
"Decoster I,"487 F.2d at 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Smithburn & Springmann,
supra note 8, at 511 (citations omitted).
79. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Decoster 1"), on remand, Crim. No. 2002-71
(D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Decoster II'), aff'd en
banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) ("Decoster III"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
80. The judgmental approach entails a case-by-case analysis. The court justified
the use of this approach by stating that the defense attorney's function is largely a
matter of professional judgment, and that in such a "fact-laden atmosphere, categor-
ical rules are not appropriate." "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 203.
81. The categorical approach articulates basic minimum duties owed by defense
counsel to his client. These duties would apply to all attorneys. "Decoster III,'" 624
F.2d at 267 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (discussing the standards set forth in "Decoster
I').
82. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83. Decoster was sentenced to 2-8 years on each count, to be served concurrently.
Id. at 1199.
84. These five grounds were: (1) counsel's delay in filing a bond review motion
after filing the motion in the wrong court; (2) counsel's declaration that he was ready
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jected the "farce and mockery" standard, stating that "a defendant is
entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting
as his diligent conscientious advocate." 85 The court adopted a categor-
ical approach, asserting that counsel should be guided by the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) Standards for the Defense Function.86 The
court then used these standards to set forth three specific duties owed
by a defense counsel to his client. 87
Judge Bazelon considered the prejudice issue in a three part test
which would determine whether a sixth amendment violation has
occurred: (1) Did counsel violate any of the specified duties?; (2) Was
the violation substantial?; (3) If the first two questions are answered
affirmatively, a sixth amendment violation exists unless the govern-
ment proves a lack of prejudice. 88
On appeal after remand, 9 the court, in a panel opinion ("Decoster
II"), held that Decoster had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel, and reversed his conviction.90 Judge Bazelon first noted that
counsel had violated the duty to investigate, previously derived from
the ABA Standards.9' Then, without applying the second part of the
for trial although he was not prepared to begin; (3) counsel's failure to inquire into
the status of the alleged accomplices' cases, resulting in a waiver of a jury trial before
the same judge who accepted guilty pleas from those alleged accomplices; (4) coun-
sel's lack of communication with the appellant; and (5) counsel's failure to call any
witnesses other than the appellant and an alleged accomplice who contradicted the
appellant's testimony. Id. at 1199-1201. Concerning this final ground, the court
commented that it "stripped [the defense case] of its credibility." Id. at 1201.
85. Id. at 1202. The court added that the "reasonable competence" standard was
only a short-hand label which could not be readily applied. Id. at 1203.
86. Id. The ABA Standards are the product of a comprehensive study by a com-
mittee chaired by Chief Justice Burger. The standards have been approved by the
ABA House of Delegates. Id. at 1203 n.24. Although the standards were not intended
to serve as criteria for judicial evaluation of ineffectiveness claims, the court added,
they could serve as relevant guidelines. Id. at 1203 n.25.
87. The court specified the following three duties: (1) counsel should confer with
his client without delay and as often as necessary to discuss matters of defense,
potential strategies and tactical choices; (2) counsel should promptly advise his client
of his rights, and take all actions necessary to preserve these rights; (3) counsel must
conduct appropriate factual and legal investigations to determine what defenses may
be developed. The duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research. Id. at
1203-04.
88. Id. at 1204, citing Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S.- 849 (1968). The court justified placing the burden of proof on the govern-
ment by noting that the burden is on the government to prove guilt. A requirement
that the defendant show prejudice would shift the burden to him to prove the
likelihood of his innocence.
89. On remand, the district court held supplementary hearings and denied the
defendant's motion for a new trial. "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 200.
90. 624 F.2d 300, 310 app. (D.C. Cir. 1976).
91. Id. at 309. See also note 87 supra and accompanying text.
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test, concerning the scope of the violation, the court found that there
was "inherent prejudice"9 2 in the nature of the violation.
The court relied on the harmless error analysis set forth by the
Supreme Court in Chapman v. California.3 This doctrine provides
that certain constitutional violations will result in automatic reversal,
without reference to the showing of prejudice.9 4 Other constitutional
violations,9 5 however, would not require reversal if the government
could establish harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Judge
Bazelon stated that the Chapman standard should apply "with greater
force"9 7 in ineffectiveness cases, since a finding of a sixth amendment
violation "necessarily casts doubt on the entire adjudicative proc-
ess." 9 8 Dissenting vehemently, Judge MacKinnon criticized the major-
ity opinion for transforming the ABA Standards into inflexible duties,
creating a situation in which nearly every ineffectiveness claim would
result in a constitutional violation.99 With specific reference to the
burden of proving prejudice, Judge MacKinnon contended that the
92. "Decoster II,'" 624 F.2d at 309-10. The court found that counsel's failure to
investigate was comparable to those cases involving governmental interference or a
clear conflict of interest. Id. See also notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text. The
court reasoned that investigation is so central to the defense function that almost any
violation of the duty to investigate would adversely affect a defendant's rights.
"Decoster II,'" 624 F.2d at 310.
93. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court was called on to decide
whether the denial of petitioners' right against self-incrimination which resulted
from the prosecutor's comments on petitioners' failure to testify could be harmless
error. Id. at 20. The Court held that the error was not harmless to the petitioners and
reversed the convictions. Id. at 26.
94. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confes-
sion)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (deprivation of the right to
counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (violation of the right to trial before an
impartial judge).
95. The Court concluded that some constitutional errors may be so unimportant
and insignificant in the setting of a particular case that they may be deemed harm-
less, thus not requiring reversal of the conviction. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
96. The Court recognized that certain constitutional error places the burden of
showing that the error was harmless on someone other than the prejudiced party.
Thus, the original common-law harmless error rule placed the burden on the benefi-
ciary of the error either to show that no injury was caused, or to have the judgment in
his favor reversed. Id. at 24 & n.9 (citing 1 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed.
1940)).
97. "Decoster II,'" 624 F.2d at 311.
98. Id. The Court added that there is authority for the proposition that such
violations can never be harmless. Id. at 311 & n.41 (citing Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974)). How-
ever, the court refused to adopt a per se approach for evaluating ineffectiveness
claims, holding that harmlessness must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Decoster II," 624 F.2d at 311.
99. Id. at 327 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
1982] EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
majority's application of the Chapman standard set the right to "ade-
quate" assistance of counsel against "the adversary guarantees of the
sixth amendment .... . 100
In "Decoster 111, "101 Judge Leventhal, writing the plurality opin-
ion, 10 2 affirmed Decoster's conviction and rejected the categorical
approach used in "Decoster I. "Judge Leventhal advanced a judgmen-
tal approach. 0 3 He asserted that "[tihe claimed inadequacy must be a
serious incompetency that falls measurably below the performance
ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers." 0 4
Judge Leventhal constructed a continuum in which claims of attor-
ney ineffectiveness could be evaluated. 05 At one end of the contin-
uum, state imposed structural or procedural impediments10 6 that per
se deprive the accused of his sixth amendment rights mandate auto-
matic reversal, even in the absence of prejudice. 107 At the opposite end
of the continuum are cases in which counsel's performance is " 'un-
trammelled and unimpaired' by state action",10 8 and the categorical
approach is not applied. In a less certain area between both extremes
fall cases involving multiple representation and late appointment,
which are not as easily analyzed and thus less susceptible to a categori-
cal analysis. 109
100. Id. at 345. This panel opinion was vacated, and the court granted the
government's motion for a rehearing en banc. "Decoster III," 624 F.2d 196, 200
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
101. 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
102. Judges McGowan, Tamm and Wilkey joined Judge Leventhal in the plural-
ity opinion. Id. at 199.
103. "The court's appraisal requires a judgmental rather than a categorical ap-
proach." Id. at 208.
104. Id. The court also placed the initial burden of demonstrating prejudice on
the accused to prove that counsel's inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial. It is
only after the appellant has made this initial showing of prejudice that the burden
passes to the government to prove that there was no prejudice to the appellant. Id.
105. Id. at 200. The court added that these differing approaches derive from how
"the courts' perce[ive]... the exactness with which a denial can be identified and
remedied, as well as their views of the need for a showing of prejudice." Id.
106. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
107. "Decoster III," 624 F. 2d at 201. The court added that a categorical approach
is appropriate because the impediments are subject to easy correction by prophylactic
rules and because state interference is involved. Id.
108. Id. at 203. The court's rationale for rejecting the categorical approach in
cases where the ineffectiveness is not government-induced may be found in the
court's evaluation of the defense attorney's function. The court reasoned that profes-
sional judgment plays such a great part in the role of defense counsel, that "[i]n this
fact-laden atmosphere, categorical rules are not appropriate." Id.
109. Id. at 202. Concerning multiple representation, the court noted that "be-
cause there is no absolute requirement that every defendant have his own attorney,"
some factual analysis is necessary, thus limiting the applicability of the categorical
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
The court concluded its analysis by focusing on the issue of preju-
dice, stating that the burden of proof is on the defendant to demon-
strate a likelihood that his counsel's incompetence affected the out-
come of the trial." 0 After the defendant satisfies this initial burden,
the government would have to prove that no prejudice resulted."'
Judge Bazelon, in a strong dissent," 2 adhered to the three step
inquiry set forth in "Decoster I. "',3 He clarified his earlier approach
by noting that it focuses on the quality of counsel's performance rather
than on just the consequences evident in the outcome of the case." 4
Judge Bazelon criticized Judge Leventhal's state action continuum by
contending that the issue is not whether the state is to blame for
counsel's actions, but whether the accused suffered a constitutional
deprivation." 5 Judge Bazelon further asserted that because state
action "permeates the entire criminal process . . . . it is the state's
responsibility, through the courts, to vindicate those rights."" 6
Addressing the prejudice issue, Judge Bazelon emphasized that the
question of prejudice must remain distinct from the threshold ques-
tion: whether the defendant has received effective assistance." 7 He
analysis. Id. at 202. Because the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney rejected a
per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following late appointment of
counsel, late appointment cases are even less susceptible to a categorical approach.
Id. See also notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
110. "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 208.
111. Id. The court found that Decoster had failed to satisfy his burden of proof.
Id. at 214. Judge Robinson filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the
affirmance of the conviction, but "deplored" Judge Leventhal's allocation of the
burden of proving prejudice to the accused. Id. at 245 (Robinson, J., concurring).
Judge Robinson devised yet another standard for measuring ineffectiveness claims:
"the defendant must point to some substantial deviation from a norm of reasonable
competence." Id. at 246. Addressing the prejudice issue, Judge Robinson favored the
application of the harmless error rule to ineffectiveness claims. Id. at 258.
112. Chief Judge Wright joined Judge Bazelon in his dissent. "Decoster III," 624
F.2d at 264.
113. Id. at 275. See also note 88 supra and accompanying text. Judge Bazelon
emphasized the overriding concern of eliminating inferior representation of indigent
defendants. "Decoster III,'" 624 F.2d at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). He also clari-
fied that the standards announced in "Decoster I" were relevant: guidelines, not rigid
criteria. Id. at 276.
114. Judge Bazelon explained that focusing on the quality of counsel's representa-
tion would be beneficial to defendants by reducing the likelihood that any particular
defendant would be prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. Additionally, Judge Baze-
Ion maintained, the court would not have to engage in the speculative inquiry of the
precise effect of counsel's error at trial. Id. at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 289 n.126. Judge Bazelon asserted that the defendant suffers from the
same degree of prejudice whether or not counsel's incompetence was induced by the
state. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 275. The only reason to consider prejudice, Judge Bazelon maintained,
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reiterated that once it has been determined that the defendant was
denied effective assistance, the Chapman rule should be applied. I8 To
hold otherwise, Judge Bazelon stated, would strip the accused of his
right to a constitutional presumption of innocence.119
B. A Comparison of the Views
The judgmental approach appears to be concerned with the main-
tenance of the adversarial system,120 while the categorical approach
seems to demonstrate a greater concern for a defendant's constitu-
tional rights. 121 The categorical approach is preferable because of its
ability to accommodate both concerns.
The judgmental approach embodies the historical reluctance of the
courts to reverse convictions based on ineffectiveness claims.12 2 Judge
Leventhal justified his support for the approach by asserting that the
court "must be wary lest its inquiry and standards undercut the
sensitive relationship between attorney and client and tear the fabric
of the adversary system."'' 23 Yet, while it is well established that
attorney-client communications merit the highest degree of protec-
tion, 124 the courts must look beyond this barrier to protect defendants
who have been victimized by attorney ineptitude. The majority's fear
that the adversary system will be unduly burdened by the application
of the categorical standard is unfounded. Attorney conduct is rou-
tinely evaluated to measure civil liability in malpractice cases without
a detrimental effect on the attorney-client relationship.1 25 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has declared that trial courts should police attor-
is to spare defendants, prosecutors and the courts a "truly futile repetition of the
pretrial and trial process." Id.
118. Id. at 290-91. See also notes 93-98 supra and accompanying text.
119. "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 291 & n.135 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432 (1895)). Judge Bazelon further suggested that a per se rule may be appropri-
ate in all cases where a sixth amendment violation has been found. Id. at 293
(Bazelon, J., dissenting). He added that a per se rule may serve as a necessary
deterrent in preserving the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 293 & n. 145.
120. See note 123 infra and accompanying text.
121. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
123. "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 208. This statement contrasts sharply with Judge
Bazelon's statement that "for so very many indigent defendants, the adversary system
is already in shreds." Id. at 297 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
124. The attorney-client privilege, the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications, dates back to the sixteenth century, where it then appeared as an
unquestioned doctrine. Keeping the secrets of his clients was considered to be "[t]he
first duty of an attorney." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
125. "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 249 (Robinson, J., concurring).
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ney conduct in order to protect defendants' sixth amendment rights. 126
It is only after the courts are willing to vitalize this Supreme Court
mandate that the sixth amendment's guarantee will be assured to
every defendant.
Judge Leventhal also criticized "Decoster I's" use of the ABA De-
fense Standards, noting that the standards were meant to be a mixture
of the "aspirational and obligatory" in character.1 27 As the dissent
noted, however, the duties set forth in "Decoster I" represent the
minimum components of effective assistance, beneath which no rea-
sonable attorney's conduct should fall.128 If an attorney fails to meet
these standards, it should be incumbent upon the courts to safeguard
the defendant's sixth amendment rights by examining the breach. A
flexible judgmental approach is not, in any event, necessarily irrecon-
cilable with the adoption of minimum standards. 21 The standards as
provided in "Decoster J"130 have the combined benefit of setting forth
a minimum level of competence as well as preserving a flexible ap-
proach to accommodate the factual circumstances of each case. The
requirement that the alleged violation must be shown to be substantial
should assuage the fear of the success of frivolous claims. Additionally,
application of the harmless error doctrine should insure against un-
warranted reversals.
Judge Bazelon's categorical approach is well reasoned and provides
greater safeguards for criminal defendants. The most obvious advan-
tage in using the categorical approach is that it is inherently less
subjective than the judgmental approach. Once a minimum set of
standards is established, the appellate courts will be given uniform
guidance, and attorneys will be on notice as to the minimum standard
of behavior that is required of them.
Furthermore, by requiring the government to bear the burden of
proving prejudice, the defendant is freed from the unduly harsh bur-
den of proof imposed on him by the judgmental approach.' 3 ' To
require the defendant to prove prejudice by way of an examination of
.126. Id. (" '[J]udges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by
attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.' ") (quot-
ing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
127. "Decoster III,'" 624 F.2d at 205. The court commented that these standards
were not put forward by the ABA as per se rules. Id.
.128. Id. at 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon emphasized that the
standards" 'are certainly relevant guideposts in this largely uncharted area' ") (quot-
ing "Decoster I," 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 n.25).
129. "Decoster 1II," 624 F.2d at 276-77 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
130. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
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the outcome of the trial may require the defendant to prove his
innocence. 132
Thus, although Decoster provides an extensive explication of differ-
ent philosophies concerning the standards by which attorney effective-
ness should be gauged, no definitive standard has emerged. It is not
surprising that states such as New York apply a wide variety of stand-
ards, often leaving the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel largely to chance. The refusal by the courts to accept the
responsibility for monitoring a categorical standard has led in at least
one New York case' 33 to the court's failure to require any minimum
level of competence, and has demonstrated in the extreme the failings
of the judgmental approach.
IV. The Right To Effective Assistance of Counsel in New York State
The right to effective assistance of counsel was recognized in New
York State long before the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Po-
well 134 and Gideon.135 The New York State Constitution of 1777
recognized that a criminal defendant, lacking adequate skills and
knowledge to prepare his defense, required the assistance of an attor-
ney to interpose between himself and the state. 136 The criminal de-
fendant in New York is protected by both the Federal and New York
State Constitutions. In many ways, the New York State Constitution
affords defendants greater rights than does the Federal Constitu-
tion. 137 For example, a lesser burden of proof to show a conflict of
interest in joint representation cases 138 and a great expansion in the
132. Id.
133. People v. Claudio, 85 A.D.2d 245, 447 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't), appeal
pending, 56 N.Y. 2d 649 (1982). See also notes 142-54 infra and accompanying text.
134. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also notes 19-25 supra and
accompanying text.
135. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also notes 29-33 supra and
accompanying text.
136. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614, 412 N.Y.S.2d
874, 877 (1978) (construing N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXXIV).
137. The protections afforded by the New York State Constitution have also been
recognized earlier than similar federal protections. Id. at 161, 385 N.E.2d at 615, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 877 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)).
138. Compare Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (trial court not required to
initiate inquiry of jointly represented defendants unless the court has reason to know
that an actual conflict of interest exists) with People v. Monroe, 54 N.Y.2d 35, 429
N.E.2d 97, 444 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1981) (per curiam) (trial court must ascertain on the
record whether jointly represented defendants understand the risks of joint represen-
tation).
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area of when the right to counsel attaches 1 39 provide additional safe-
guards for defendants in New York State courts.
New York courts have evaluated ineffectiveness claims involving
governmental interference 40 in much the same manner as federal
courts by presuming a constitutional violation without requiring proof
of prejudice.' 4' When defendants are denied their sixth amendment
rights by attorney incompetence, however, New York courts have
failed to apply a consistent standard.
A. People v. Claudio: A Failure to Require Any Level of Competence
People v. Claudio 1 42 reveals the weaknesses of the judgmental ap-
proach. In Claudio, the Appellate Division of the New York State
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the defendant's
statements to law enforcement personnel made prior to the com-
mencement of formal judicial proceedings should be suppressed be-
cause the statements resulted from incompetent advice rendered by
defense counsel. 43
Claudio involved a sixteen year old youth who was indicted for
felony murder. 144 The defendant was delivered to the District Attor-
ney's office by his retained counsel. 45 Significantly, the attorney never
ascertained whether his client was wanted by the police,146 nor did the
139. For a discussion of the expanding right to counsel in New York see Note, The
Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351 (1982); The
Uncounselled Confession: A New York Variant, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND Soc. PROB.
343 (1979).
140. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
.141. See People v. Chiarello, 82 A.D.2d 837, 439 N.Y.S.2d 664 (2d Dep't 1981)
(mem.). In Chiarello, defense counsel was directed by the court not to divulge to
anyone, including his client, information presented by the People during a bench
conference. The Court held that this "gag rule" denied the defendant his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 837-38, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
665.
142. 85 A.D.2d 245, 447 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't 1982).
.143. Id. at 246, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
.144. The defendant, Angel Claudio, was indicted with his cousin, Randolfo
Maldonado, for murder in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree,
and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Id. at 251, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
976.
.145. There was some dispute in the testimony at the suppression hearing whether
Claudio surrendered of his own accord or on the advice of his attorney, Mark Heller.
Id. at 247-48, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 974-75. The trial court found, however, that Claudio
was acting on Heller's advice. Id. at 251, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 976. The Appellate
Division stated that the trial court's conclusions were supported in the record and
should not be disturbed on appeal. Id.
.146. Id. at 248, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 975. Heller also admitted knowing that Claudio
had been questioned two days previously, but had not been arrested. Id.
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attorney take notice of the fact that the prosecutor lacked sufficient
evidence without a statement to charge the youth. 147 Furthermore,
the attorney lied to his client concerning the prosecutor's willingness
to accept a plea.148 Finally, defense counsel, in a televised press con-
ference, publicly acknowledged his client's guilt by urging others
involved in the crime to surrender themselves to the authorities. 149
The court found that the defendant's right to counsel had attached,
and that this right included the right to competent counsel.1 50 Al-
though the court acknowledged that defense counsel "failed to fulfill
his responsibility to protect his client's interest diligently and compe-
tently" 15' and that defense counsel's conduct was "egregious" and
incompetent,15 2 the court unanimously denied the defendant's motion
to suppress the statements. 153 Adopting Judge Leventhal's reasoning in
"Decoster III," the court stated that determining attorney competence
is a " 'judgment call,' " and relied on a state action theory to deny the
claim. 14 The court stated that there was no opportunity for judicial
intervention. 155
Reliance on a state action theory shifts the emphasis to the cause of
the attorney's incompetence rather than to the quality of his perform-
ance. Although it may be easier for an appellate court to identify and
remedy ineffectiveness of counsel when it can be monitored by the
government,15 6 the sixth amendment demands more. Attorney incom-
petence can deprive a defendant of his sixth amendment rights
/
147. Id.
148. Heller was "categorically" told by District Attorney Santucci that a plea
bargain was not a possibility. Rather than relate this information to Claudio, Heller
informed Claudio that he was still negotiating. Id.
149. 85 A.D.2d at 249, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
150. 85 A.D.2d at 256, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 979-80 (citing People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d
137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981)).
151. Id. at 251, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 977. The court added that it is significant to note
that on appeal, the People did not argue to the contrary. Id.
152. Id. at 258, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 981. The court emphasized that Heller's actions
did not occur in the context of a trial or other formal judicial proceedings. Id. This
distinction seems tenuous, however, as Heller's misconduct could have been prejudi-
cial to Claudio regardless of the context in which the misconduct occurred. See note
115 supra and accompanying text.
153. Claudio, 85 A.D.2d at 264, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
154. Id. at 259, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 981. The court relied on Judge Leventhal's
opinion in "Decoster III." The court focused on the fact that Heller's incompetent
actions occurred at a time when the state, through its judges, could not have been
aware of the misconduct to correct it. Claudio, 85 A.D.2d at 259, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
981.
155. Id.
156. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
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whether or not the government had some influence over the incompe-
tence.
Even in cases of less obvious government involvement, such as late
appointment cases, 15 7 the state involves itself by certifying that an
attorney is competent to practice law. Bar examinations and character
committee evaluations give the state's imprimatur to an attorney's
basic ability. Furthermore, it is the attorney who is giving life to
Gideon's mandate that the state must provide counsel. Thus, the
attorney acts as the state's agent for the sixth amendment guaran-
tee. 58 Strict reliance on government interference results in serious
prejudice to defendants whose attorneys' conduct has denied them of
their sixth amendment rights without overt government action. Thus,
in Claudio, in an effort not to "penalize the People for that which
could not reasonably have been prevented" by the state, 150 the court
effectively penalized the defendant for relying on the advice of a state
certified attorney. Claudio evidences the detrimental consequences
which may be suffered by a defendant when attorney incompetence
goes uncorrected.160
B. New York: The Trend Toward Subjectivity
The New York Court of Appeals, like the federal and other state
courts, initially applied the traditional "farce and mockery" stand-
ard.' 6 ' However, following the trend set by McMann, 6 2 the court has
recently adopted a more flexible approach.
In People v. Bennett,6 3 the court focused on defense counsel's lack
of pre-trial preparation, rather than on the outcome of the trial.
157. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
158. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 114 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[i]ndeed, if responsibility for error must be apportioned between the parties, it is
the State, through its attorney's admissions and certification policies, that is more
fairly held to blame .... "); "Decoster III," 624 F.2d at 289 n.126 (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) ("[s]tate action permeates the entire criminal process"); Bines, Remedying
Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures From Habeas Corpus, 59
VA. L. REV. 927, 981-82 (1973).
.159. Claudio, 85 A.D.2d at 260, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
.160. Claudio faces 25 years to life in prison if convicted of the charge. N.Y. PENAL
LAW (McKinney 1982) (Sentence charts).
,161. See, e.g., People v. Cossentino, 38 N.Y.2d 760, 343 N.E.2d 768, 381
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1975) (applying the "farce and mockery" standard) (citing People v.
LaBree, 34 N.Y.2d 257, 313 N.E.2d 730, 357 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1974); People v.
Lampkins, 21 N.Y.2d 138, 233 N.E.2d 849, 286 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1967); People v.
Brown, 7 N.Y.2d 359, 165 N.E.2d 557, 197 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1960); People v. Toma-
selli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 557, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1960)).
162. See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
163. 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972). In Bennett, the
defendant made numerous attempts to commit suicide prior to his arrest and was
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Although the court upheld the defendant's claim by use of the "farce
and mockery" standard, the court cautioned that counsel must "con-
duct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine
if matters of defense can be developed .... ,14 Thus, although the
court seemed to recognize that the evaluation of ineffectiveness claims
requires more than just an examination of the trial's outcome, the
court nevertheless adhered to the traditional standard.
It was not until 1976 that the court appeared to abandon the "farce
and mockery" terminology. In People v. Droz,15 defense counsel
failed to prepare for trial, resulting in serious prejudice to the defend-
ant. 16 The court found a sixth amendment violation without relying
on the "farce and mockery" standard. The court did not provide a
definitive standard, stating that the representation was not "adequate
or effective in any meaningful sense of the words." 6 7
Although the "farce and mockery" standard was abandoned for a
time in New York after Droz, the court returned to it as an alternative
standard in People v. Aiken. 118 In Aiken, the court developed a flexi-
ble approach by which to evaluate the defendant's claim.6 9 The court
found that where the defendant had been absent from the trial, and
the attorney had engaged in reasonable trial strategy, under either the
"farce and mockery" standard or the "reasonable competence" ap-
proach, the representation was effective. 70 Thus although after Aiken
it may have been reasonable to assume that the court was still consid-
ering a more traditional standard, considerable confusion resulted in
the lower courts because of the alternative standard.' 7'
adjudged incompetent by psychiatrists. Defense counsel, however, did not read any
records dealing with the defendant's mental condition prior to the trial. Counsel was
so woefully unprepared on the insanity defense that the court requested the prosecu-
tor and the psychiatrist retained by the prosecutor to assist defense counsel. The court
concluded that the attorney was "so completely unfamiliar with either the facts or
the law bearing on his client's case as to doom the defense to failure." Id. at 465, 280
N.E.2d at 638, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
164. Id. at 466, 280 N.E.2d at 639, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (citing Coles v. Peyton,
389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968)).
165. 39 N.Y.2d 457, 348 N.E.2d 880, 384 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1976).
166. Counsel's errors included: the failure to meet with the defendant until the
morning of trial, the failure to contact witnesses, advising the jury of the defendant's
extensive criminal record, and the failure to request a copy of the defendant's
testimony. Id. at 459-61, 348 N.E.2d at 881-82, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 405-06.
167. Id. at 463, 348 N.E.2d at 883, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
168. 45 N.Y.2d 394, 380 N.E.2d 272, 408 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1978).
169. The court expressed its "desire to avoid the confining strictures of a standard
presumptively applicable to all cases." Id. at 398, 380 N.E.2d at 274, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 447.
170. Id. at 399, 380 N.E.2d at 275, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
171. In People v. Baldi, 76 A.D.2d 259, 429 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1980), rev'd,
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To date, the New York Court of Appeals has not attempted to
reconcile these varying standards. In a recent case, People v. Baldi,172
the court acknowledged that Aiken did not provide a definitive stand-
ard by which to measure attorney competence. The Baldi court ex-
pressed concern about confusing "true ineffectiveness with mere losing
tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis." 1 73
The court held that an unsuccessful defense will not necessarily pro-
vide the basis for an ineffectiveness claim.174 Rather than adhering to
a specified standard, the court stated that "so long as the evidence, the
law and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and
as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided
meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have
been met.' '1 75
The range of competency standards also varies within the depart-
ments of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court. The First Department recently applied the "reasonable compe-
tence" standard to deny a claim of ineffective assistance in a case
where defense counsel failed to request a charge embodying a defense,
even after he had been invited to do so by the trial judge. 76 Yet, in a
later case, the court used the "meaningful representation" standard to
uphold an ineffectiveness claim after defense counsel failed to prop-
erly present an alibi defense. 177
54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981), the court noted the
remaining although diminished vitality of the "farce and mockery" standard. The
Fourth Department interpreted Aiken as heralding the New York Court of Appeals'
departure from the traditional standard, People v. Wise, 64 A.D.2d 272, 276, 409
N.Y.S.2d 877, 879-80 (4th Dep't 1978), but later returned to the use of the "farce and
mockery" standard. See note 181 infra and accompanying text.
172. 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981). In Baldi, the
defendant challenged his counsel's conduct on the following grounds: (1) counsel's
failure to pursue the defendant's claim of actual innocence; (2) counsel's handling of
the expert witnesses; (3) counsel's testimony at the trial and suppression hearing; (4)
counsel's role in bringing about the interrogation of the defendant; and (5) the
quality of counsel's efforts to suppress the defendant's confession. Id. at 147, 429
N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The court, however, labeled counsel's defense
"well-grounded but unsuccessful." Id. at 140, 429 N.E.2d at 401, 444 N.Y.S.2d at
894.
173. Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
174. Id. at 140, 429 N.E.2d at 401, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
175. Id. at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (citations omitted). The
court added that counsel's conduct was neither unreasonable nor a farce and mock-
ery. Id. at 151-52, 429 N.E.2d at 408, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
176. Counsel also failed to object to evidence of uncharged and unrelated criminal
activities. See People v. Sellars, 74 A.D.2d 551, 425 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1st Dep't 1980)
(mem.).
177. See People v. Long, 481 A.D.2d 521, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1981)
(mem.). In Long, defense counsel examined a witness concerning defendant's where-
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Similarly, the Second Department has applied two different stand-
ards. In one recent case, the court upheld the defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to utilize the insanity
defense by applying the Aiken alternative standards. 78 In a later case,
the court used the "reasonable competence" standard to find that
counsel's failure to request a pre-trial suppression hearing was insuffi-
cient to support an ineffectiveness claim. 79 The Third Department
has cited Aiken to deny ineffectiveness claims, but has yet to explicate
a definitive standard. 80 The Fourth Department has employed the
Aiken alternative standard to find that questionable trial strategy did
not deprive a defendant of his sixth amendment rights.' 8'
The New York Court of Appeals has not made any definitive state-
ments as to whether the Chapman harmless error analysis is appropri-
ate in reviewing ineffectiveness claims. In People v. Crimmins,,8 2 the
court adhered to the Chapman rule, stating that errors of constitu-
tional magnitude are nonprejudicial only when proof of guilt is over-
whelming and where "there is no reasonable possibility that the error
might have contributed to defendant's conviction and that it was thus
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'183 The court also implied in
dictum that a per se rule may be appropriate in certain ineffectiveness
cases. 184
The New York courts' use of three different standards: "meaningful
representation," "reasonable competence," and "farce and mockery"
suggests a judicial preference for a subjective, case-by-case analysis.
abouts not at the time of the crime, but twenty-four hours after the crime had been
committed. The court found that this error "went to the heart of the alibi," and
undermined the defense. Id. at 522, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
178. See People v. Baldi, 76 A.D.2d 259, 429 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1980), rev'd,
54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981). See also note 172 supra
and accompanying text.
179. See People v. Williams, __ A.D.2d -, 449 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (2d Dep't
1982) (mem.); See also People v. Jackson, 74 A.D.2d 585, 424 N.Y.S.2d 484 (2d
Dep't 1980) (mem.).
180. See People v. Little, __ A.D.2d __, 451 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dep't 1982)
(mem.); People v. Early, 85 A.D.2d 752, 445 N.Y.S.2d 252 (3d Dep't 1981) (mem.);
People v. Ellis, 83 A.D.2d 652, 442 N.Y.S.2d 184 (3d Dep't 1981)(mem.).
181. See People v. Smith, 61 A.D.2d 91, 401 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1978). See
also People v. Sanin, 84 A.D.2d 681, 446 N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th Dep't 1981); People v.
Dietz, 79 A.D.2d 476, 437 N.Y.S.2d 185 (4th Dep't 1981) (adopting the Aiken
approach).
182. 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975).
183. Id. at 237, 326 N.E.2d at 791, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
184. The court stated that if an appellate court concludes that, inter alia, defense
counsel's inadequacy was so great that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial, the
court must reverse the conviction without regard to prejudice or overwhelming guilt
of the defendant. Id. at 238, 326 N.E.2d at 791, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 218-19.
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The lack of a uniform standard provides no guidance for lower courts
to review ineffectiveness claims or for attorneys to measure their own
conduct. New York's adoption of the judgmental approach, which
rejects explicit minimum standards, seems anomalous in view of the
increased judicial concern with attorney incompetence, 5 and the
frequent citation of the ABA Standards and other guidelines by the
courts. 186 More importantly, the criminal defendant is placed at a
great disadvantage by the usage of a completely subjective standard.
Such a standard effectively amounts to no standard at all.
V. Recommendations
Remedies for the increasing instances of attorney incompetence 18 7
can be divided into two major areas: (1) measures designed to prevent
claims from arising by improving the quality of legal representation,
and (2) uniform standards to guide the appellate courts after a claim
of ineffectiveness has arisen.
A. Improving the Quality of the Legal Profession
There are certain disparities in the quality of representation af-
forded to criminal defendants which are not susceptible to mitigation,
such as attorney inexperience18 8 or the particular choice of trial tac-
tics. 89 These differences in quality are to be expected, however, and
185. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
186. At least 2,000 appellate court opinions have cited various ABA Standards
with favor. Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CalM. L. REV. 255, 269 (1974).
187. Four principal goals have been suggested for a proper system of remedies: (1)
to provide redress by compensation for loss suffered; (2) to deter the responsible party
and others similarly situated from repeating the misconduct; (3) to intervene timely
and to prevent threatened injury; and (4) to eliminate undue advantage attained
through the misconduct. Bines, supra note 8, at 970.
188. But see United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982). In Cronic,
the court appointed a real estate attorney to represent a defendant who faced a
sentence of up to sixty-five years in prison in a complex fraud case. The court held
that the attorney's lack of relevant experience in criminal law denied the defendant
the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1129.
Extensive experience in the field, however, does not guarantee competent repre-
sentation. See Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 799 (lth Cir. 1982) (writ of habeas
corpus granted where a defendant was sentenced to death after being represented by
an attorney with more than fifty years of criminal trial experience who "failed to
inform himself of basic Georgia criminal procedure .... ")
189. Courts are generally reluctant to inquire into matters of trial strategy. See,
e.g., People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981)
(unsuccessful trial tactics do not necessarily indicate ineffective assistance); People v.
Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 399, 380 N.E.2d 272, 275, 408 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (1978)
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should not, by themselves, give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Yet, disparities that rise to the level of a sixth amendment
violation can and should be corrected.
Many commentators have suggested that the process of upgrading
the quality of legal representation should begin with the law
schools.190 Law schools have been criticized for failing to provide an
education which includes practical and ethical considerations in addi-
tion to a sound theoretical base. It has also been suggested that law
schools place an increased emphasis on clinical education. '9' Although
law schools have the potential to improve the quality of legal repre-
sentation significantly, their impact will necessarily be limited due to
the short period of time they have to educate their students. 1
9 2
The American Bar Association has suggested that there are three
essential components of professional legal competency: (1) analytical
ability and knowledge of the law, (2) ability to perform basic legal
tasks and (3) diligence and ethical responsibility in applying those
skills.'9 3 The limited utility of looking toward the law schools for
improvement in attorney performance is most apparent in the third
("[t]he right to counsel was not intended to afford a defendant, aided by the wisdom
of hindsight, to second guess matters of trial strategy..."). But see Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 115 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("while I can agree that the
proper functioning of our system of criminal justice . . . places heavy reliance on the
professionalism and judgment of trial attorneys, I cannot accept a system that
ascribes the absolute forfeiture of an individual's constitutional claims to situations
where his lawyer manifestly exercises no professional judgement at all - where
carelessness, mistake, or ignorance is the explanation for a procedural default.")
190. See, e.g., Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1, at 19 (advocating the
use of clinical programs); Burger, Special Skills, supra note 7, at 232 (one cause of
inadequate advocacy is the law schools' failure to inculcate high enough standards of
professional ethics and adequate programs of advocacy); Carrington, The University
Law School and Legal Services, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 402 (1978) ("[a]ll of the
rhetoric by the lawyers and bar leaders, and all of the complaints by the public will
not measurably improve the profession unless and until the original product - the law
school graduate - is improved. If we want real improvement, it must come from the
root source, the law school") (quoting Braverman, Law Schools Should Teach Com-
petency, Morality and Economics, 65 ILL. B.J. 454, 455 (1977)).
191. See, e.g., Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 1, at 41; Burger, Special
Skills, supra note 7, at 233; Kaufman, supra note 7, at 177.
192. There are other factors which must be taken into consideration in looking to
the law schools as the primary source of reform. It is questionable whether law
schools can closely monitor the student's individual progress when most classes are
large in number. Also, standard law school examinations generally test only a limited
area of a student's analytical ability. Finally, once a student graduates, the law
school ceases to exert direct influence over him.
193. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE
LAW SCHOOLS 9 (1979).
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component, diligence and ethical responsibility. Although the law
schools may excel in teaching analytical skills, a lack of practical
training may serve to transform an academically capable student into
an ineffective advocate. 194
In addition to advocating changes in the law school curriculum,
other commentators have suggested that there is a need for continuing
legal education programs.9 5 Presently, two-thirds of the states have
voluntary continuing legal education programs.9 6 These voluntary
programs may be of limited utility, however, as the participants are
already likely to be highly motivated and competent. 197 Nine states
have mandatory continuing legal education programs, which may
also be of limited utility. Such programs, which necessarily operate on
a large scale, may be forced to sacrifice quality due to the large
number of participants.' Moreover, mandatory programs are not
sensitive to those lawyers who keep themselves informed of new de-
velopments in the law. Forced participation in these programs is likely
to generate resentment among attorneys.19
Selective mandatory continuing legal education programs may rep-
resent an appropriate compromise between voluntary and mandatory
programs. A selective system could apply to those attorneys who have
demonstrated incompetence, and could also serve as a deterrent
against correctible incompetence.2 00 As no failsafe system to insure
attorney competence can be devised, appellate courts will need to
194. "The greatest intellect may be rendered ineffective in the practice of law by
other traits such as excessive shyness, excessive aggressiveness, sloth, inattentiveness
to detail, and poor judgment about people and their behavior." Carrington, supra
note 190, at 421. See also Frankel, supra note 7, at 618 ("[t]he significant qualities
distinguishing good from bad lawyers - and thus, the areas for truly major concern
about 'competence' - are matters of character, judgment, wisdom, morals and
attitude, not the business of technical proficiency").
195. See generally, Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61
A.B.A.J. 575 (1975); Wolkin, More on a Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61
A.B.A.J. 1064 (1975).
196. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
GEO. L.J. 705, 725 (1981).
197. Id. In fact, a recent study indicates that there is no correlation between
competent appellate advocacy and participation in continuing legal education pro-
grams. Id. at 726 (citing REPORT AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMM.
To CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION To PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS To
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1978), reprinted in 79 F.R.D.
187, 206-07 (1978)).
198. Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, supra note 195, at 576.
199. Id. Mr.Wolkin advocates a selective monitoring system. Id. at 577.
200. Id. at 577-78. The deterrent benefit would not be an incident of the manda-
tory program.
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adopt uniform standards to review claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
B. Appellate Standards of Review
Courts should look toward adopting a categorical approach for
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The ABA Stand-
ards should be relied on in an effort to develop such an approach.
These standards represent the efforts of leading members of the legal
profession to formulate minimum standards in the field of criminal
justice. 2°1 Although the Standards were not intended to become inflex-
ible guidelines, 20 2 they provide a well reasoned accordance of views of
how the criminal justice system should ideally operate. The Standards
seek to minimize the tensions between a defense counsel's duty to his
client and his duty to the court. 20 3 Counsel must be sufficiently aggres-
sive to safeguard his client's constitutional rights, but he also must
cooperate with the court, so as not to prejudice his client's interests.20 4
Once clear guidelines are established, attorneys would be on notice as
to the minimum level of conduct expected of them, and the courts
would have a uniform method for evaluating ineffectiveness claims.
As an alternative to the use of the ABA Standards, a minimum set of
duties could be compiled 20 5 and used by the courts to measure
whether an attorney has fulfilled his basic responsibilities to his client.
Several duties could be formulated which represent the minimum
responsibilities of a competent defense attorney. Certain procedures
should be followed, including: extensive consultations with the client,
201. See Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251 (1974).
202. Originally, the ABA Standards were referred to as "minimum standards."
The word "minimum" was dropped, however, when it was recognized that the
standards were better described as desirable or acceptable. Jameson, supra note 186,
at 258.
203. The tension may arise where the court asks defense counsel questions con-
cerning confidential information obtained from his client. Counsel must then either
breach his duty to protect his client's confidences, or appear uncooperative to thejudge, which may itself prejudice his client's interests. AM. BAR. Ass'N PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To THE PROSECUTION FUNC-
TION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 149 (1971).
204. Id.
205. These minimum guidelines could be implemented through five means: (1) by
legislation; (2) by court rules promulgating criminal procedure; (3) by constitutional
amendment; (4) by reform in practice or custom on the trial bench or at the bar, or
(5) by appellate court opinions adopting the duties. Nichols, Placing The Standards
In The Marketplace: The Implementation Process, 12 AM. CIM. L. REV. 263, 269
(1974).
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complete investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case and
the filing of appropriate discovery and suppression motions. 20 6 Such a
list would serve to benefit attorneys by putting them on notice, and
may ultimately serve to decrease the number of ineffectiveness claims.
The courts should bear the responsibility for providing relief to the
defendant who has been victimized by attorney incompetence. Other
remedies may be available, such as disciplinary proceedings and civil
damage actions, but in practice, these remedies are beyond the reach
of most criminal defendants who lack the opportunities and the finan-
cial resources necessary to institute these actions. 207 Moreover, a mon-
etary award hardly seems appropriate relief for the defendant who
receives a jail sentence.
Thus, because of the inadequacy of other remedies, the appellate
courts should bear the responsibility of formulating uniform standards
by which to evaluate ineffectiveness claims.
V. Conclusion
Appellate courts are currently applying a variety of standards to
evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The need for a
uniform set of standards is especially pertinent in view of the serious
consequences suffered by criminal defendants who are deprived of
their sixth amendment rights. Defendants are deserving of a uniform
application of this fundamental right which should not "vary with the
sensibilities and subjective judgments of various courts. The law de-
mands objective explanation, so as to ensure the even dispensation of
justice." 208 Until the courts develop a uniform standard, few convic-
tions will be reversed based on sixth amendment violations, although
instances of attorney incompetence will surely continue.
Joanne Legano
206. For a model investigative worksheet see Bazelon, Realities of Gideon and
Argersinger, supra note 7, at 836-38.
207. For a criticism of alternative remedies see Bines, supra note 8, at 972-76.
208. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974).
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